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Abstract
As a result of recent federal legislation, Clark County, Nevada has been
charged with conducting a comprehensive vulnerability assessment and
implementing a hazard mitigation policy. This research paper identifies the
challenges of intergovernmental relations and policy implementation, defines the
mitigation and assessment process, and describes the steps taken by Clark
County to date. Definition of the legislation, emergency management, and terms
relating to the process are provided. Findings reveal that the attempt to
implement a federal program in an intergovernmental arena meet predicted
challenges and describes how these challenges have affected Clark County’s
ability to successfully implement policy.
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Introduction
Clark County is no stranger to natural disaster. Drought, high winds,
extreme heat, and earthquakes are among the risks faced by those living in and
around the Las Vegas Valley. When disaster does strike lives are lost, property
is destroyed, and services are interrupted. The time and expense of recovering
from a disaster can be immense. Advanced technology and learning from past
experiences allows for anticipation of and preparation for disaster, including
natural disasters. Through careful analysis of the risks to the population and
infrastructure of Clark County, it is possible to reduce a disaster's effect and keep
people and property out of harm’s way.
Recent legislation and amendments to existing legislation have resulted in
Clark County being required to conduct both community vulnerability
assessment and an all-encompassing disaster mitigation plan. These actions,
ordered by the US Congress’ passing of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
(DMA 2000) were mandated first to Nevada and then to Clark County and its
entities. Legislation requires that all natural hazards posing a risk to the
population and structures of Clark County be considered in the plan. The
purpose of such planning is to prevent loss of human life and damage or
destruction of structures as well as to assure that critical facilities are able to
maintain operation and services in the event of a disaster. Compliance with DMA
2000 is required in order to obtain post-disaster funding through the Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program as of November 1, 2004.
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Comprehensive vulnerability assessment and mitigation planning are
multi-step tasks that take a combined effort and large amount of time to
implement. This research focuses on the beginning steps of the vulnerability
assessment and analyzes Clark County’s attempt to implement this portion of
DMA 2000. The particular method that Clark County officials chose to follow as
well as challenges faced and progress made will be discussed.
This paper consists of four sections. First, a review of what existing
literature and research reveals about coordinated intergovernmental efforts,
policy implementation, and emergency management planning is provided. The
methodology utilized to date by Clark County in an effort to comply with DMA
2000 as well as findings regarding challenges faced in attempting to implement
DMA 2000 are then described. Finally, future research potential is presented.
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Review of Literature
Policy and Program Implementation
Following the passing of a law in congress, the wheels must begin to spin
in order for the law, whether it is a policy or a program, to be implemented. In his
book, The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes a Law,
Eugene Bardach (Bardach, 1977) uses a metaphor to explain this process and
the functions at work. He compares the policy or program to a machine, created
by a blueprint that is the legislation mandating the item that must be
implemented. The machine has been created to fix a problem, reduce federal
spending and lessen the effects of disaster in the case of the Disaster Mitigation
Act of 2000. In order for the machine to be effective, it must be clear as to what
the machine is supposed to do, how it is supposed to do it, and who and how it
will serve. If these components of the machine are not clear, implementation of
the policy or program will become difficult as it trickles through the layers and
agencies of government. The original objectives of a policy are generally only a
hint of what the actual outcome of implementation will be. The ultimate result of
policy depends on the method of implementation. Implementation is defined as
those events and activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative public
policy directives, which include both the effort to administer and the substantive
impacts on people and events (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). While
challenges faced trying to enact legislation have often times been considered
trivial, chance, or blamed on particular circumstances, research recognizes
repeated behaviors that occur as governments attempt effective implementation.
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Giandomenico Majone and Aaron Wildavsky, in their article “Implementation as
Evolution,” explain that policies are continuously transformed by implementation
actions and that implementation consists of an altering of objectives in order to
correspond with resources available and that acting to implement a policy
inevitably leads to changing the policy (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). The
challenges that are faced in implementing a policy often result in a pattern of
reformation of the original “machine” as implementation occurs.
Challenges facing policy and program implementation include the several
levels involved (intergovernmental relations), resources (technical, financial, and
staffing), behaviors, agendas and priorities, decision making issues, allocation of
financial resources from the mandating agency, attitudes and response of
constituents, and the commitment and leadership skills of those involved in
implementation. (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Bardach, 1977). These
challenges result in major revisions to a policy, as displayed by Mazmanian and
Sabatier (1983) in the chart below.

Stages (Dependent Variables) in the Implementation Process
Policy outputs of
Implementing

Compliance with
Actual impacts
Major revision
⇒ policy outputs by ⇒ of policy outputs ⇒ in statute
Agencies
target groups

A policy or program is a result of a bill, which passes through congress,
and becomes a law. Once the law is passed, the enforcing federal agency
begins the steps necessary to enact the law, generally assigning the task to
agencies at the state or local level. In the interim, the law may be subject to
court cases, resulting in changes, should opposition to the law exist. Once the
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state and/or local levels have assumed the responsibility of implementation, the
law is placed in the hands of particular agencies. The director(s) of the agency
may assume the responsibility or delegate a portion of the work to his or her
employees and in the case of DMA 2000, collaborating agencies and the public.
It is assumed that those involved possess an understanding of the objectives and
purposes of the legislation. However, interpretation and the challenges of
implementation discussed in this section tend to lead to the altering of the original
policy. Legislation is often vague, leaving implementers with some uncertainty as
to expectations as well as enabling them to read their own interpretations into the
law (Nice, Fredericksen, 1995). A metaphor that may be used to describe this
issue is the child’s game of telephone. The message changes as it is whispered
from one child to the next until the final child reveals a message much different
than the message whispered by the initial child.
Federal policies generally represent federal priority and include an
incentive for implementation. The priority of the federal government may not
coincide with the priorities of the local level and incentives offered by the federal
government may or may not entice compliance (Nice, Fredericksen 1995). If the
incentives are not enough to encourage compliance, the local government may
not take the steps necessary to implement policy. Another challenge arises after
implementation considering the large and growing number of local governments
making it difficult to monitor and enforce compliance.
Policy implementation is a political process that, due to the nature of our
government, involves many levels of government and is subject to change along
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the way. Regardless of how small or large the policy at hand is, a policy will
meet resistance and revision before it is implemented at its final destination to
serve its intended purpose.

Intergovernmental Relations: Coordination and Cooperation
Federalism, defined as, “a system of government in which power is
divided between a central authority and constituent political units,” (American
Heritage Dictionary, 2000) allows states the ability to make and enforce decisions
in their given jurisdiction independent of federal involvement. However, the
relationship between the federal government and state governments (and their
entities) includes a financial reliance, by states and localities, on the federal
government and in return for financial assistance, compliance with federal
mandates. While financial assistance may provide incentive enough for state
and local governments to comply, the federal government may also wield the
power of the Supremacy Clause. Although states do possess and cling tightly to
specified powers, this clause typically makes those laws outlined by the United
States Constitution and federal legislation superior to state and local laws. If a
state or local government contradicts legislative action at the federal level, the
legislation at the federal level may preempt the state or local legislation under the
Supremacy Clause, requiring compliance with federal mandate (AP Government,
2003).
As previously stated, mandates are often times attached to incentives and
often come in the form of federal grants or loans. During the 1960’s the federal
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system underwent a transformation including the number of federal grant-in-aid
programs increasing. As more and more communities increased their
dependence on federal funding, the federal government increased their
involvement in community affairs and policy making. Federal aid expenditures
grew from $4,935 million in 1958 to $25,029 million in 1970. This amount has
continued to grow, with the United States Census Bureau reporting
intergovernmental revenue to be $291,949,750 billion in 1999-2000 (US Census
Bureau, State and Local Government Finance). Due to the origin of the money
being federal programs, federal supervision and control are part of the package.
Federal programs, such as those created to fight poverty in the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, had a national purpose. Issues arose when the national
purpose contradicted the local purpose and priorities, but national purposes
tended to take precedence when a financial incentive was attached (O’Toole,
1993). Not only did the federal government mandate how their money must be
spent, measures were also set in place to monitor spending and assure that
money allotted to the states for a specific purpose was in fact spent in the
manner intended and not on a local priority. This system of “carrots and sticks”
continues today with the idea that federal money meaning compliance with
federal priorities and non-compliance resulting in a loss of funding.
The restructuring of federal support and reliance that occurred during the
1960’s allowed federal agencies to pick and choose which state and local
agencies they wished to work with and the conditions under which funding would
be provided. In some cases federal administrators chose to charge existing
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agencies with federal mandates while other cases resulted in the creation of new
agencies specific to the purpose at hand.
With the increased involvement of the federal government in state and
local affairs came a debate over which type of federalism the United States was
modeling, cooperative or dual federalism. In dual federalism, the state and
federal governments possess separate and independent powers. Cooperative
federalism, which more closely defines the post-1960’s transformation system,
results in greater shared responsibility and levels relying upon each other in part
to survive and succeed (O’Toole, Jr. 1993). Argument exists that federal
government powers extending or intermingling with local governments leads to
the weakening of the local government. Eisenhower, while running for president,
advocated for the preservation of state and local control in order to maintain the
foundation upon which our country was built. While a case does exist for federal
intervention and the promotion of a national purpose and comprehensive policy,
just a strong of case exists for the maintaining of local authority.
Not long after the federal government became a regular player in state
and local government, it was realized that cooperation and coordination problems
existed. Grant-in-aid programs were developed with a program approach,
treating each program or incentive as an independent case. This resulted in the
lack of a master or strategic plan, confusion, and lack of coordination between
government levels and agencies. It became difficult to determine which agencies
took precedence when contradiction of interests arose and became clear that if
coordination was to become a reality in the community, a need exists for
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someone to be able to say that when inter-agency conflict occurs, one practice or
project is to prevail over another (O’Toole, Jr. 1993).

In an attempt to improve

coordination between agencies and levels of government, policy makers chose a
system of mutual adjustment, which promotes negotiation among agencies that
are considered equal instead of a system of central direction, which would have
created more of a hierarchical system. This action was taken when it became
clear that coordination and cooperation among intergovernmental agencies was
not an easy task.
While the focus turned to improving cooperation and coordination in an
effort to make government processes smoother, the effort to do so instead
resulted in additional layers of government as more players became involved.
Beyond the federal, state, and local governments, counties, towns and
townships, neighborhoods, and new agencies were among groups and
governments desiring a role in policy and decision-making. The rise in the
number of individuals and agendas involved in carrying out federal programs
created a need for competent leaders with the ability to plan, initiate, and
coordinate effectively (Sundquist, James and Davis 1969). Federal programs are
reliant on strong leadership and structured community institutions.

In order to

assure the success of the mandate, a community must have available the
necessary resources and be willing to commit them to the project at hand. If
cooperation is expected, the agency charged with facilitating the implementation
process must possess the respect of the cooperating agencies and should not
hold a competitive interest in the matter.
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Emergency Management, Definitions
Mankind has faced natural disaster and devastation throughout time,
responding and rebuilding as damage occurs. Realizing that simply responding
to a disaster was not enough and seeking a more pro-active approach, the
1990’s were declared the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction.
This proclamation called for an anticipation of natural disasters and a reduction of
their effects through hazard mitigation. Mitigation, defined as, “advanced actions
to lessen the impact of disaster on social and built environments,” became an
important step in comprehensive emergency management (Drabeck, Thomas
and Hoetmer 1991). Mitigation goes a step further than simply being prepared
for a disaster as mitigation efforts strive to reduce the impact of a disaster
through structural and non-structural actions. Adding mitigation to the process
resulted in four phases of emergency management; preparedness, response,
recovery, and mitigation. While this research focuses on the mitigation phase, it
is important that the remaining phases be identified as all phases are set into
motion by a disaster and overlap each other. These phases, presented in the
following order by International City Manager’s Association, are the four phases
of comprehensive emergency management (Drabeck and Hoetmer, 1991).
Preparedness: Action taken prior to a disaster occurring to develop the
plans and systems of emergency operations and emergency management.
Response: Action taken immediately before, during, and directly after a
disaster. The purpose of response is to minimize personal injury and damage
through emergency functions. Emergency functions may include warning
systems, evacuation, search and rescue, and providing food, shelter, and
medical services.
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Recovery: Occurs immediately after a disaster strikes and includes the
efforts to restore services in the area affected and bring community back to a
normal state. Recovery activities may include damage assessment, removing
debris, and restoring supply of necessary survival items. Recovery also has a
long-term component, which includes the creation of mitigation plans based upon
the events of the recent disaster.
Mitigation: Mitigation may take place as a result of a prior disaster that is
likely to re-occur or in anticipation of a different type of disaster. The purpose of
mitigation is to reduce risk through planning for a disaster and may include
evaluating and planning land use, creation of management plans in areas at risk,
relocation or strengthening of structures in harms way, implementing codes and
policy, and educating the public.
Although acts mandating hazard mitigation planning are drafted and passed at
the federal level and directed first to the states and then to individual localities
within each state, it is at the local level that planning must occur. Mitigation plans
are specific to the types of hazards that pose a risk to individual communities and
the infrastructure located within. Therefore, specific planning must occur at the
local level and extend upward in an effort to create a comprehensive national
disaster hazard mitigation program. Officials must follow three steps in this
process; identification, analysis, and strategy preparation. (Drabeck and
Hoetmer, 1991) In identifying hazards posing a threat to their community,
officials should consider all potential hazards and their characteristics, the
locations at which they have historically occurred and are likely to occur again,
the probability of occurrence or re-occurrence, the impact on livelihood and
property, and what actions are currently underway to reduce damage from the
identified hazard. Analysis must include analyzing risks in the event of the
disaster occurring, the vulnerability of the population and property of the
community to injury or damage, and estimated economic loss. Strategy
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preparation includes preparing the plans, recommending plans for approval, and
maintaining and updating plans as necessary (Drabeck and Hoetmer 1991).
While mitigation efforts may be applied to natural or man-made disasters,
DMA 2000 requires only natural hazard mitigation which would include damage
caused by floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, soil problems, winds, or
any other damage that occurs as a result of a force of nature. People and
property are affected by such hazards and mitigation takes both into
consideration, prioritizing first human life and second property.
Two forms of mitigation actions exist, structural and non-structural.
Structural mitigation actions strive to contain or lessen the effects of a hazard
through the use of actual, physical structure. When attempting to mitigate
disaster by use of structural efforts a focus is given to strengthening exposed
infrastructure to withstand the effects of a disaster. Examples of structural
mitigation include building dams or dikes to prevent flooding or relocating
buildings directly in harms way. Non-structural mitigation involves a policy
approach and includes such actions as adopting and enforcing codes and
regulations, acquiring land that is considered at risk to prevent unsafe usage, and
providing preferential taxation and insurance rates based on a property owner’s
proximity to the hazard risk area.
In order to effectively assess community vulnerability, officials on the local,
state, and federal levels must work together and offer both financial and
personnel resources. Local emergency management officials generally lead the
effort to assess vulnerability and implement mitigation and often times face
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resistance for various reasons. These reasons include costs, time, personnel
commitment, and contradiction of priorities. The outcome of plans generally
result in regulations or programs that not all participants agree with, making
decision making difficult. Public, private, and non-profit agencies must
participate in order to create a comprehensive vulnerability assessment and
mitigation plan. A further challenge to the process of mitigation is the fact that,
due to growth and changes in population and infrastructure, plans must be
updated regularly. Emergency Managers must face resistance and promote
mitigation by educating the community on its benefits. These officials must be
able to convince community leaders, policy makers, and the public that while
expenses are incurred and sacrifices are made, the benefit of mitigating disaster
outweighs the costs. The case must be made that preventing disaster saves
lives and property and costs less than repeatedly recovering from disaster.
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Methodology: The Vulnerability Assessment Process and Mitigation
Planning Undergone by Clark County, to Date
In order to comply with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, the state of
Nevada and Clark County has begun the chore of assessing vulnerability and
planning mitigation efforts. During this portion of the paper, focus will be given
to the vulnerability assessment steps taken thus far (steps one through three)
and the progress made since the implementation process began during the
summer of 2002. Discussion will include the model Clark County is following and
the steps involved, progress made to date, participating individuals and agencies
and their roles, and what the county is yet to achieve to complete implementation
requirements.

Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
In an effort to curb the disaster-repair-disaster cycle and reduce federal
spending in the area of emergency response, congress passed the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000 on October 30, 2000 (Public Law 106-390). This act
amends the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of
1988 and sets into place a requirement for state, local, and tribal governments to
create and implement hazard mitigation plans. The primary goal of this
legislation is to identify where hazards are occurring and re-occurring, where
disaster funds are being spent, and what steps can and will be taken to mitigate
the effects of the disaster. Ultimately, DMA 2000 aims to establish a national
disaster hazard mitigation program in order to reduce the number of lives as well
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as structures lost Plans are required to be submitted for review by January 30,
2004 and as an incentive to create and implement pre-disaster plans, the federal
government has ordered that states without such plans will not be eligible for
hazard mitigation funding (post-disaster relief) beyond this date.
The verbatim definition of the act includes “to authorize a program for
predisaster mitigation, to streamline the administration of disaster relief, to control
the Federal costs of disaster assistance, and for other purposes” (DMA 2000).
DMA 2000 focuses on natural disasters and requires states to identify and
assess hazards that pose a risk to their community. The act requires localities to
consider historical damage in their area. Specifically, hazards that have
repeatedly caused damage in a given area and the area affected by the given
hazard are to be targeted to prevent repeat damage. Beyond preventing
avoidable damage to property and loss of life, the act states that planning should
also assure that critical services and facilities, such as government buildings and
emergency response, are able to maintain operation in the event of a disaster.

Implementing DMA 2000 in Clark County, Nevada
The Clark County Office of Emergency Management has been assigned
the task of carrying out Clark County’s vulnerability assessment and mitigation
planning. The ultimate goal of this effort is the creation of a comprehensive local
mitigation plan. The purpose of the resulting plan is to represent Clark County’s
“commitment to reduce risks from natural hazards, serving as a guide for
decision makers as they commit resources to reducing the effects of natural
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hazards” (DMA 2000). In order to assure an all-encompassing plan, it is required
that all communities within Clark County as well as local and regional agencies in
the county be involved in the assessment and planning stages. Further,
business owners, private and non-profit agencies, stakeholders, and the general
public are required to be allowed to have an input opportunity.

Guidelines
The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 did not provide a tutorial or step-bystep process that planning teams are required to follow. Instead, guidelines have
been provided and communities are allowed some choice in the means by which
they will produce the necessary final product. By allowing localities the freedom
to choose the process or model that best fit their particular community and
resources, the federal government has provided localities with ownership of their
assessment and planning process. Guidelines state that the plan must include
documentation of who was involved (public and private) in the planning process
and the process undergone to develop the plan. A risk assessment, identifying
and prioritizing hazards that pose a risk to Clark County, is the first required step.
This assessment (also referred to as vulnerability assessment) is to include a
summary of each hazard identified and the potential impact of each particular
hazard. Clark County, due to its political make-up, opted to create a multijurisdictional plan. Therefore, risk assessment is required to identify risks to the
entire county. Following the risk assessment step, a mitigation strategy is
required to be decided upon based on reducing the risks of hazards identified
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during risk assessment. The strategy section must to include a description of
mitigation goals to reduce vulnerabilities, identification and analysis of mitigation
policy in place or in the works, and an action plan prioritizing and explaining
implementation and administration actions. Once the plan is completed, a
maintenance plan must also be established to assure monitoring, evaluating, and
updating the mitigation plan every five years (Code of Federal Regulations, Title
44).
Upon completion of the risk assessment and mitigation plan, the entire
document will be submitted first to the state and then to the FEMA Regional
Office for review and approval.

Steps taken by Clark County
Clark County managers stepped up to face the task of complying
with DMA 2000. Jim O’Brien, Manager of the Clark County Office of Emergency
Management, recognized that accomplishing the assessment portion of the act
would be the most straightforward if a tutorial were followed. After reviewing
several available plans and tutorials specific to risk assessment on the internet,
Mr. O’Brien chose to model Clark County’s vulnerability assessment after the
North Carolina Vulnerability Assessment Tutorial (the tutorial). The Department
of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Coastal Services Center developed this tutorial’s methodology. This operational
template was chosen in part because it implemented and relied upon the use of a
Geographic Information System (GIS) to store, map, and analyze data. The GIS
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Department of Clark County, offering a mature collection of data to assist in the
completion of the tutorial, became an influential participant in the assessment
and planning process.
The NOAA tutorial outlines seven steps in a vulnerability assessment.
The steps are hazard identification, hazard analysis, critical facilities analysis,
societal analysis, economic analysis, environmental analysis, and mitigation
opportunities analysis. Within each of the seven steps exist sub-steps to be
completed sequentially and build upon each other. Steps and sub-steps are
displayed below.
Step 1-Hazard Identification
1a: Identify Hazards
1b: Establish relative priorities for your hazards
Step 2-Hazard Analysis
2a: Map risk consideration areas for hazards.
2b: Assign scores within risk consideration areas, where possible.
Step 3-Critical Facilities Analysis
3a: Identify critical facilities categories.
3b: Complete a critical facilities inventory.
3c: Identify intersections of critical facilities with high-risk areas.
3d: Conduct vulnerability assessment on all critical facilities.
Step 4-Societal Analysis
4a: Identify areas of special consideration.
4b: Identify intersections of special consideration areas with high-risk
areas.
4c: Conduct a general inventory of special consideration/high-risk
locations.
Step 5-Economic Analysis
5a: Identify primary economic sectors and locate economic centers.
5b: Identify intersection of economic centers and high-risk areas.
5c: Conduct general inventory of high-risk economic centers.
5d: Identify large employers and their intersection with hazard risk areas.
5e: Conduct vulnerability analysis on structures of large employers as
critical facilities.
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Step 6-Environmental Analysis
6a: Identify secondary hazard risk consideration sites and key
environmental resource sites.
6b: Identify intersections of secondary risk sites, environmentally sensitive
areas, and natural hazard risk consideration areas.
6c: Identify key environmental resource locations and their proximity to
secondary risk sites.
6d: Conduct vulnerability analysis on priority secondary risk sites as
critical facilities.
Step 7-Mitigation Opportunities Analysis
7a: Identify areas of undeveloped land and their intersection with high-risk
areas.
7b: Inventory high-risk undeveloped land.
7c: Assess the status of your existing flood insurance program
participation.
The first step was to identify the hazards posing a threat to Clark County.
The first sub-step of the hazard identification process consisted of introductory
and brainstorming sessions held on July 15th and August 12th, 2002 during which
participants defined vulnerability (susceptible to physical or emotional injury) and
created a comprehensive list of threats and vulnerabilities within Clark County.
Officials representing Clark County, Boulder City, North Las Vegas, the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, City of Las Vegas, City of Mesquite, and City of
Henderson attended this meeting. This meeting resulted in two lists, natural and
human (man-made) risks.
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Natural
Wind (dust, high wind, traffic)
Flood (Dam failure and river flood)
Flash Floods
Tornado
Earthquake
Drought
Wildfire
Severe Weather (Microburst?, Lightning, Heat)
Avalanche and Slides
Volcanic Ash
Natural Epidemic
Invasive Species

Human (Man-made)
Aircraft Crash
Civil Disturbance
Dam Failure
Explosives
Fire
Fuel Storage
Utility Failure
Hazmat Disaster
Radiologic (High and low level)
Water System Failure
Transportation System
Terrorism
Pipelines
Communication
Mines
Landfill
Recognizing that the meeting did not include complete representation, a
follow-up memo was sent to “partners in public safety” inviting further input and
providing information on the process.
Once hazards presenting threat to Clark County were identified, the next
step was to prioritize risks in order to decide which hazards posed the greatest
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threat and should be focused upon as a part of the mitigation plan. In order to
weigh each hazard against the others, the tutorial provided a formula to apply to
each hazard. This formula took into account the frequency at which the hazard
has occurred in the past, the area impacted when the disaster does occur, and
the magnitude. Frequency was scored in terms of time, area of impact
categorized as either the entire county, a township/range block, census tract,
block group, or site (x,y coordinate), and magnitude ranged from federal disaster
to a specific, insured loss. Below is the formula followed and scoring rubric.
(Frequency + Area of Impact) x Magnitude=Total Score
Frequency Area of Impact
Score
1
2
3
4
5

Magnitude

10+ years
Site (x,y)
Insured Loss
6-9 years
Block Group
Local
1-5 years
Census Tract
State
2-12 months Township, Range Federal Emergency
0-30 days
County
Federal Disaster

Decisions were made by the collaborating group as to what score to assign each
hazard in each category. The group referred to Office of Emergency
Management historical records to determine frequency and magnitude scores.
After each hazard was assessed, the formula produced the following scores.
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Natural Hazards Score
Avalanche/Slides
8
28
Drought
25
Earthquake
40
Epidemic
32
Flash Flood
25
Flood
Invasive Species
18
Severe Weather
18
Tornado
14
Volcanic Ash
18
32
Wildfire
Wind
18

Human Hazards
Score
Aircraft Crash
Civil Disturbance
Communications Infrastructure
Dam Failure
Epidemic (Bio-Terror)
Explosives
Fuel Storage Disruption
Gang Activity
Hazardous Materials (HazMat)
Mines
Pipelines
Radiologic (Low-level waste)
Structural Fire
Terrorism Threats
Transportation Systems
Utility Failure
Waste Treatment
Water System Failure

12
20
16
30
25
10
24
14
14
8
18
28
6
12
24
27
21
28

After scores were assigned to each disaster, the team used the scores as
a tool to prioritize risks and decide which risks would be focused upon during the
vulnerability and mitigation planning process. Scores ranged from a total score
of six in the case of structural fires to 40 in the case of a natural epidemic.
Statistical analysis resulted in the following scores:

Mean
Median
Mode

Natural Hazards Human Caused Disasters
23
18
21.5
17
18
12

Because time limitations prevented the option of analyzing each hazard, the
team decided upon a cut-off score of 25. Hazards scoring 25 or higher would be
assessed and included in planning, and hazards scoring 24 or lower would not
be focused upon during this process. The final selection included drought,
25

earthquake, natural epidemic, flash flood, flood, and wildfire in the natural hazard
category and dam failure, bio-terror epidemic, utility failure, and water system
failure in the human-caused category. The creation of this list satisfied step 1b,
establishment of priorities for identified hazards and thus completed step 1.
Analysis of the identified hazards was the goal of step two. This step
included GIS as a major component as the first sub-step was mapping the risk
consideration areas. The purpose of this step was to target the priority areas on
which to focus. Existing county GIS files as well as data acquired from
appropriate agencies were utilized in order to map hazards as they had
historically occurred within Clark County. An attempt was made to collect data
that best represented historical disaster occurrence and damage. In some
cases, and as was noted in the tutorial, there were limitations to existing data and
analysis was forced to be based upon what data was available. Several data
files were outdated or were originally created for an independent project and then
forgotten. For example, a file of earthquake faults included only those faults in
the central portion of the Las Vegas Valley and did not include the outlying, but
potentially vulnerable, areas. Because this is ultimately a Clark County project,
access to Clark County GIS data is unlimited, but data from other entities
depends on their cooperation and the quality of their data. In creating maps, it
became a case of the maps being only as accurate or current as the information
provided. Data collection involved communicating with officials from such
agencies as the Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Reclamation, and
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Regional Flood Control and relied heavily upon communication and making the
correct contacts.
Once data was compiled and ready to be mapped, it became necessary to
create region boundaries. Boundary options discussed included township/range
blocks, commission districts, and regions created solely for the purpose of risk
mapping. Ultimately, five regions dividing the county were created using existing
and practical boundaries (see Appendix A). Interstates 15 and 95 as well as
Highway 93 served as boundary lines as did state and county lines. Gaps in
boundaries were resolved by extending existing lines to close each region. This
process was completed using GIS, resulting in a shapefile, a GIS map file,
displaying five regions dividing Clark County.
Following the mapping of hazards and the creation of a power point
presentation to allow analysis and scoring, a meeting was held to attempt to
assign scores to each consideration area (region). A copy of this presentation,
including maps, can be found in Appendix B. This meeting, held February 11th,
2003, was attended by individuals representing the City of Las Vegas Emergency
Management and GIS departments, the State of Nevada Division of Emergency
Management, Boulder City Emergency Management, Clark County Emergency
Management and GIS Management Office (GISMO), North Las Vegas
Emergency Management, the Las Vegas Fire Department, and the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) Environmental Studies Program. Representation by
other agencies and individuals had been encouraged as well.
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Two scoring rubrics were presented following the presentation of mapped
hazards in an attempt to assign scores, per hazard, to each region (see
Appendix C and D). The goal of this step was to identify which regions obtained
the greatest risk for each hazard and where to focus assessment and mitigation
efforts. Discussion included what factors to consider, as the tutorial did not
specify an exact scoring process. This meeting did not result in assigned scores,
as there was confusion as to the most appropriate method to use. It became
evident that it was difficult to consider hazards independent of their locations or
the populations affected by an event. Questions also arose in regards to whether
or not an area that did not cause loss of life or structure or economic damage
should be considered priority. An example of this was the difficulty in comparing
an area of extreme flood danger that was not populated to a heavily populated
area with low or moderate flood danger. Attendees could not find sense in
assigning the unpopulated area a higher score, yet the particular step of the
tutorial did not consider such situations. The meeting adjourned with the
understanding that further analysis would need to occur prior to scores being
assigned.
In an effort to understand the most effective means of scoring, the input of
Dr. David Hassenzahl, an assistant professor in Environmental Studies at UNLV
and active participant in the planning process, was requested. During a meeting
with Dr. Hassenzahl, discussion suggested that criteria be developed per hazard
to allow scoring each hazard independently, rather than attempting to rank
hazards using identical criteria. Two options were discussed. The first was
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creating criteria specific to each hazard, such as flooding. Regions might be
placed in categories such as falls within 500-year flood zone, falls within 100year flood zone, region does not contain flood zones. The second option, which
Dr. Hassenzahl presented in a paper titled “White Paper for the Clark County GIS
Vulnerability Assessment Project: Looking Ahead, Designing Mitigation, and
Managing Uncertainty,” utilized the FEMA threshold for assistance, which states
that a disaster must incur a cost of $2.50 per person in an impacted area in order
to justify federal assistance. Using this method would result in evaluating costs
based on assessments of land and structure value and assessing damage by the
cost incurred to respond and repair. Regions with a higher assessed value
would then be considered more at risk and be focused on as priority.

Cost per person Score
$2.50+
$2.01-2.49
$1.51-2.00
$1.01-1.50
$0-1.00

5
4
3
2
1

While agreeing that the FEMA threshold was the best-fit scoring rubric to use,
hazards have not been scored using this method to date. Time limitations and
the lack of individuals with risk management expertise or experience has put this
step temporary on hold. In order to best utilize current resources, efforts have
instead been focused on step three, with an intention of and need to return to
step two.
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Step three, creating an inventory and maps of critical facilities, is currently
underway. Facilities being considered critical include those facilities providing
services necessary for responding to a disaster and allowing for the continued
operation of infrastructure. Completing this step has involved referring to the
tutorial, creating a comprehensive list of critical facilities within Clark County,
collecting the necessary information regarding each facility, and mapping critical
facilities using GIS in order to identify their intersections with high-risk areas.
Information has been gathered through accessing county records and consulting
with individuals from the agencies representing the particular facilities. An
inventory consisting of all critical facilities, their facility type, name, address,
owner or operator, phone number(s), and contacts will serve as an important and
required product of the vulnerability assessment (see Appendix E for a sample
inventory).
Upon completion of the inventory and mapping, representatives from
participating agencies will once again be brought together to conduct a
vulnerability assessment on all critical facilities. This will allow for the
identification of critical facilities that may be poorly located (in harm’s way) or
may require measures to be taken to lessen the effects of a disaster on the
critical facility and its ability to provide services. Beyond allowing for a
vulnerability assessment though, this step also produces and important resource
to be utilized in the event of disaster. To date, this is as far as the process has
progressed in the tutorial. It is expected that step three will be completed in May
2003, allowing officials to continue on to steps four through seven.
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Structural and Non-Structural Mitigation in Place
While assessing vulnerability has been a goal thus far, another step of the
process has also been underway. Prior to the development of a mitigation plan,
current policy must be analyzed. In an effort to understand current mitigation
policies in place as well as identify mitigation opportunity in Clark County, a
spreadsheet was created for each hazard being evaluated. This spreadsheet
includes several measures in both the structural and non-structural categories.
Structural mitigation measures include action taken to strengthen structures,
containment of hazard, and relocation of facilities in harm’s way. Non-structural
mitigation measures include statutes and ordinances, regulatory actions, and
capital improvement programs. Representatives from the agencies most related
to each hazard were contacted and provided information specific to their agency.
Existing documentation, including existing in-house vulnerability assessments,
were reviewed and referenced. This process is on going and will result in a
comprehensive narrative of mitigation policy currently in place in Clark County.
Individuals working on the process hope to use this document to identify
opportunities for further mitigation measures in Clark County. Once gaps in
policy and opportunities are identified, the appropriate agencies may increase or
implement policy in the necessary areas.
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Research Findings:
Challenges Facing Implementation of DMA 2000 in Clark County, Nevada
Implementing a new policy is not a simple task. Review of existing
literature and research suggested that the process of implementing the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000 and its provisions would meet the predicted challenges of
policy implementation in the intergovernmental arena. These challenges
included communication issues, time restraints, budget constraints, and conflict
of priority and agenda. Further, the classic issues surrounding federalism have
appeared during this process. Because this is an intergovernmental effort,
agencies and departments are expected to work together. However, it was the
Office of Emergency Management that was charged with the task, resulting of
course in this agency being the most concerned with the completion of the task.
The agencies not directly charged with the project, yet expected to provide
necessary input and man hours, are naturally not as motivated.
The federal government has wielded its power over the state and
threatened the loss of federal dollars if localities do not comply. The agencies
and individuals attempting this process have clearly needed a motivating factor to
complete implementation considering the commitment required. However, the
question arises as to whether or not the threat of lost resources is enough to
entice compliance or if another factor is resulting in compliance. Throughout the
process, skepticism has existed as to whether or not the federal government
would really withhold post-disaster funding if Clark County did not meet the
requirements of DMA 2000 in time. It is difficult to believe that the federal
government would not provide funding in the event of a natural disaster that
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caused loss of human life or a large level of property damage. This suggests
that the system of federal incentives may not be effective standing alone and that
greater underlying motivators must be present.
Regardless of the incentive and Clark County’s response to the potential
loss of funds, Clark County has shown obvious intent to comply in that the
process is moving forward. Time, money, and personnel have been dedicated to
this project for a year and documentation of progress exists. While the federal
mandate can be attributed to some level of compliance, other factors are
motivating compliance as well. Discussion at meetings has revealed not only
gaps in current mitigation policy, but also a desire for the existence of a more
comprehensive document. Local decision makers recognize that specific areas
in Clark County lack policy to protect them from historically occurring hazards.
An example of this exists in the case of Mt. Charleston, a rural community in a
heavily wooded area of the county. Mt. Charleston is vulnerable to wildfire and
yet very few regulatory measures are in place to prevent the start or spread of
wildfire. Further, only one route exists as a means of escape from the area in the
event of a disaster. Perhaps these gaps in policy and measures are due to a
conflict of priorities or a lack of resources. Regardless, bringing individuals
together and analyzing policy as a team has resulted in a greater awareness and
has been a step forward in making Clark County a safer place to live. Thus, the
desire to safeguard our communities and residents may in fact be considered a
motivator for compliance. An additional motivating factor is professional
reputation. Those charged with leading the project, specifically the director of the
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Clark County Office of Emergency Management, have a reputation to uphold in
completing the assigned and expected tasks of their position.
In order for progress towards successful implementation to occur, those
involved in the process are required to possess a clear understanding of the
objectives. One challenge in effectively implementing the provisions of DMA
2000 has been confusion in regards to the objectives. A clear format to follow
does not exist and the steps are not outlined. In the case of Clark County, the
individual assigned the task of advancing the project did not have an emergency
management or mitigation background, making the learning curve steep.
Without an initial understanding of the objectives, it became difficult to move
forward as a lack of sense of direction existed. As the task of completing the
necessary steps has made its way from the mandate itself through the layers of
government and into the hands of those responsible for the specific steps,
confusion has occurred as to how to carry out the process. DMA 2000 provides
a purpose, but lacks specific methodology. While there is some benefit to a lack
of mandated methodology (freedom and utilizing a means that best fits a
particular community), the lack of guidelines have made the process at times
frustrating for individuals not possessing experience in such a project. A large
amount of literature and policy in the area of disaster mitigation exists, making
concrete interpretation and understanding of expectations difficult. Because the
planning was assigned to existing agencies in lieu of creating an agency specific
to mitigation planning, the assessment and plan became an additional
responsibility for agencies possessing and focused on their own priorities. A lack
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of time and personnel as well as agency-related objectives taking precedence
over DMA 2000 objectives has made the process of implementation slow.
As described in the literature review, priorities stifle implementation.
Several agencies on federal, state, county, and city levels have been involved in
Clark County’s vulnerability assessment. Naturally, individuals representing their
agency tend to prioritize their specific agency’s mission. An example of this has
occurred when state mitigation planning meetings have centered on earthquake
mitigation as a result of the Earthquake Safety agency having large
representation. Over representation (or over zealous representation) in one area
and under representation (or non-enthusiastic representation) in another area
may result in misrepresentation of the risk of specific disaster. Clark County has
been very careful in assuring that all hazards are considered and each hazard
has appropriate representation.
Communication has posed another hurdle to implementation. Due to the
nature of the information required to be documented, agencies are skeptical to
share sensitive or protected information. For example, the Las Vegas Valley
Water District complied with a request for information, but was unable to share
specific details of their operations for security reasons. Many details relating to
hazard mitigation include secure information and, considering the current state of
our nation and recent breaches in security, officials are reluctant to share
sensitive or secure information. The Clark County Disaster Mitigation Plan will
be published by FEMA upon completion. While sensitive material will only be
referenced and not published, the number of individuals involved in planning
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makes sharing sensitive material a risk in itself. The intergovernmental nature of
this project in itself has stifled communication. Different entities work different
schedules making coordination of communication difficult. Often times
messages were not replied to, perhaps due to miscommunication, failure to relay
messages, or returning a call in regards to mitigation a low priority.
Ownership of risk had to be alleviated while mapping hazards. The
tutorial followed suggested using township/range blocks for mapping purposes.
However, the size of Clark County and the large number of township/range
blocks made this method impractical. Other options considered were mapping
using current incorporated boundaries and the unincorporated land of Clark
County or commission districts. Choosing either of these methods would have
resulted in political ownership of hazards, potentially creating animosity or
skewed policy. Instead, officials chose to create five non-political regions that did
not follow any political boundaries.
The size of government in Clark County has presented a challenge as
well. Clark County consists of several cities as well as a government of its own.
Further, state and federal agencies have jurisdiction in the county and their land
and policies must be considered. A comprehensive collection of data has been
required and the number of agencies to contact and include have made this
process difficult. Again, each of these agencies and offices has their own
missions and responding to requests for mitigation policy has proven to not be
priority. Agencies also compete for funding and naturally consider their mission
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to take precedence over the missions of others, causing communication and
representation issues.
The deadline for compliance has also been a factor influencing progress.
The original deadline was extended a year, perhaps creating the idea that ample
time existed to complete the plan and allowing more urgent tasks to become
priority. Therefore, planning efforts have been to be slowed, removing
momentum from the process.
Perhaps the largest obstacle or roadblock to smooth implementation has
been the fact that local governments are expected to work together. While an
incentive was offered and funding provided for the planning process, these
factors are not influential to all parties expected to participate. While the
community as a whole will benefit from vulnerability assessment and mitigation
planning (through less damage during a disastrous event), a tangible reason to
become involved or offer resources does not exist. Agencies approached and
asked to make a commitment naturally see this process as another task being
added to an already busy schedule. Some agencies have jumped on the
bandwagon, enthusiastically offering input and providing resources, while others
have failed to participate or offer input. This has resulted in over representation
in some cases and under representation in others, preventing a truly
comprehensive plan from emerging from the process. As is typical, those with an
agenda are more apt to become involved for the advancement of their cause,
leaving those issues less represented (but perhaps just as urgent) left out. As
discussed by Mazmanian and Sabatier, the product resulting from
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implementation is dependant on those involved and may vary drastically
depending on which agencies are represented. This fact reiterates the
importance of inviting input from stakeholders at all levels in order to ensure an
equal opportunity for representation as well as a comprehensive document.
Clark County is encountering typical hurdles as they attempt to assess
vulnerability and implement the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. Progress is
being made and a greater understanding of objectives is occurring, but issues of
policy implementation and intergovernmental relations will continue to surface as
the mitigation planning process advances.
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Conclusion
Much work still remains in the completion of a disaster mitigation plan for
Clark County. While this research has focused on the vulnerability assessment
and beginning steps of planning, several steps are yet to be taken. Further
research and work will include continuing through the steps outlined by the
tutorial and collecting existing mitigation policy. Research opportunities include
analyzing maps as well as gaps in existing policy and opportunities to improve
policy and reduce risks. During this process, Clark County may choose to refer
to the planning process followed by other localities as models and incorporate
their own method as well.
Having not analyzed the progress of other counties or localities, it is
impossible to state where in the process Clark County is compared to other
areas. Clark County has continued to make progress, regardless of the
challenges and obstacles being met. Considering the desires of the leadership in
the Clark County Office of Emergency Management, GISMO, and the
Emergency Management offices of the individual cities, it is predicted that a plan
will be completed as mandated. While compliance will result in a guarantee of
federal dollars to assist in response to disaster, the more valued outcomes may
be increased communication and the existence of a comprehensive mitigation
document. Overall, Clark County residents will benefit in that their lives and
property will be more protected in the event of a disaster.
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